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In Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C.,1 two women in New York agreed to 
have a child together by artificial insemination.2  The child was born to the 
unmarried couple in 2009.3  The child took the surname of the 
nonbiological mother, who then cared for the child at home.4  The 
relationship between the two women eventually broke down, and four years 
later, the genetic birth mother refused to allow the nonbiological mother to 
contact the child.5 
The nonbiological mother—the “other mother”—sought joint custody 
and regular visitation rights over the genetic mother’s objection that the 
nonbiological mother lacked standing and was not a parent within the 
meaning of the applicable statute.6  Ruling for the other mother, the New 
York Court of Appeals embraced a functional test for standing, which 
“relate[s] to the post-birth relationship between the putative parent and the 
child.”7  By rejecting the “bright lines” approach tethered to heterosexual 
parenting and biological ties, the court recognized the equal claims of same-
sex parents.8 
Contrast Brooke S.B. with Lehr v. Robertson.9  In Robertson, an 
unmarried man and woman dated, cohabited, and conceived a child.10  
After the child’s birth, the mother “concealed her whereabouts” from the 
father until he located the child in 1978 with the help of a detective 
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 9. 463 U.S. 248 (1982). 
 10. Id. at 268 (White, J., dissenting). 
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agency.11  By that time, the woman had remarried and had petitioned for 
her new husband to adopt the child.12 
Because the biological father had not registered as a putative father, his 
contact with the child was restricted.13  Although he had petitioned 
separately for paternity and visitation,14 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
biological connection alone was insufficient to raise an objection.15  Only 
when the biological father “demonstrates a full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood” through personal contact and actual 
relationship may he invoke constitutional protection.16  Thus, the Court 
embraced a functional test for parenthood. 
The different outcomes in Brooke S.B. and Lehr demonstrate the inherent 
instability of other parents in contrast to the legal parenthood of genetic 
birth mothers.  Other parents’ status is relational rather than intrinsic, and it 
must be earned rather than acquired at birth.  In many ways, the legal 
interests of other mothers and nonmarital fathers are yoked:  they do not 
gestate, give birth, or nurse, yet they consider themselves equally fit 
parents.  Other mothers and nonmarital fathers, like those in Brooke S.B. 
and Lehr, are involved in the conception plan,17 whether by cooperating in 
assisted reproduction or by propagative intercourse.18  Despite such 
prenatal involvement and contributions, other parents’ status is less secure. 
If, as the Court in Lehr reasoned, marriage is “[t]he most effective 
protection of the putative father’s opportunity to develop a relationship with 
his child,”19 what happens when this status is unavailable, unwanted, or 
rejected?  This Article examines the parental interests of nonmarital 
partners of genetic birth mothers.  Without the legal parents’ consent and 
cooperation, other parents are reduced to legal strangers to the child. 
As demonstrated in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,20 narrow legal 
definitions of “family” exclude functional domestic units that may still 
satisfy the intent of the applicable family law.21  And while family law 
generally recognizes multiple forms of parenthood claims, it largely defers 
to the primacy of maternity.22  Indeed, states privilege maternity over 
 
 11. Id. at 269. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 262–63 (majority opinion). 
 14. Id. at 252. 
 15. Id. at 261. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 501 (N.Y. 2016) (“That 
decision no longer poses any obstacle to those courts’ consideration of standing by equitable 
estoppel here, if Brooke B. proves by clear and convincing evidence her allegation that a 
pre-conception agreement existed.”). 
 18. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250; Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 500. 
 19. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263. 
 20. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 21. See id. at 505. 
 22. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 653, 660 
(1992); Ramsay Laing Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine:  A Defense, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 
339 (1982). 
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equally valid claims to parentage, which disadvantages nontraditional 
families.  This Article questions this traditional presumption. 
There is a robust body of scholarship23 and jurisprudence24 addressing 
psychological parents, assisted reproductive technology, surrogacy, and 
same-sex parents, which reinforces the primacy of heterosexual marriage 
and procreation.  This tradition suggests a vulnerability of parental status 
involving the other parent.  Now that legal parenthood can be approached in 
a number of ways, it is time to take a critical look at the preeminence of 
motherhood and gestation in the determination of parental status and 
fitness. 
I.  DEFINING MATERNITY 
The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) was first drafted in 1973 to 
“address . . . the status of the nonmarital child.”25  Two additional acts were 
enacted in 1988 and 1989 to respond to issues arising from reproductive 
technologies26 and putative fathers.27  Most recently amended in 2002, the 
UPA is currently adopted by nineteen states.28 
The UPA provided only a brief definition of “maternity” because, when 
it was drafted, there had not been many challenges to a biological mother’s 
legal parenthood.  At common law, which developed before assisted 
reproductive technology, conclusions about childbirth and parentage for 
women regarding their biological children remained unquestioned.29  
Indeed, cases involving disputed maternity were thought to be so 
uncommon that the initial UPA drafters dismissed the need for proliferated 
legislative treatment.30  The drafters did not want to “burden these already 
 
 23. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 17–20 (1973) (articulating the indicia of psychological parenting as 
daily interaction, companionship, and shared experiences); Martin F. Leonard & Sally 
Provence, The Development of Parent Child Relationships and the Psychological Parent, 53 
CONN. B.J. 320, 327 (1979). 
 24. See, e.g., Christian v. Randall, 516 P.2d 132 (Colo. App. 1973) (holding that 
transsexual orientation was an insufficient ground for a change in child custody); Lippens v. 
Powers, 179 So. 3d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (reversing an injunction for protection 
against stalking for a nonbiological parent maintaining contact her with daughter); In re 
Matter of Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) 
(overturning Florida’s ban on gay adoption); Moses v. King, 637 S.E.2d 97 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2006) (finding same-sex cohabition insufficient grounds to modify custody). 
 25. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS 
2002). 
 26. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS 1989). 
 27. UNIF. PUTATIVE & UNKNOWN FATHERS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1988). 
 28. Why States Should Adopt UPA, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http:// 
www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Why%20States%20Should%20Adopt%20UPA 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/LX3U-2M2Z]. 
 29. See Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomnic Decisions in Egg Donation:  Unscrambling 
the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REV. 265, 267–68 (1995). 
 30. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 106 cmt. 
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complex provisions with unnecessary references to the ascertainment of 
maternity.”31 
Since the last UPA revision in 2002, the law has witnessed extraordinary 
changes in the recognition and protection of LGBT individuals and 
families.  In 2003, Lawrence v. Texas32 decriminalized sodomy laws.33  
Bans on gay and lesbian adoption were overturned first in Florida in 201034 
and nationwide in 2016.35  And same-sex couples’ right to marry was 
recognized as a fundamental right in all fifty states after the Supreme Court 
handed down Obergefell v. Hodges36 in 2015.37 
The 1973 UPA sought to guarantee that “all children and all parents have 
equal rights with respect to each other.”38  Despite significant 
transformations in family structure and diversity, the contemporary legal 
conception of parenthood, and particularly maternity, reflects the core 
principles of the 1970s. 
Statutory resistance to recognition of the rights of other mothers 
demonstrates the instability of nonbiological maternity and the difficulty of 
redefining the term “parent.”  In same-sex relationships, where shared 
genetic parenthood is a practical and scientific impossibility, birth mothers 
tautologically have superior claims to children over their partners.  This 
illustrates the troubling gap between the assertion of fundamental rights and 
equitable claims to parenthood. 
The UPA lacks a comprehensive expression of legally cognizable 
“maternity” and instead relies on birth, adoption, or judicial determination, 
with exceptions made for gestational agreements.39  Unlike paternity claims 
that have robust statutory, judicial, and scholarly examinations, current 
definitions of the “mother” are largely based on assumption and custom.40 
States that have adopted the UPA continue to base parentage on a 
heterosexual model that presumes the existence of at least, but not more 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 33. Id. at 578. 
 34. See In re Matter of Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2010). 
 35. See V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017 (2016) (per curiam). 
 36. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 37. Id. at 2607–08. 
 38. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2 cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 1973). 
 39. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS OF UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2002) (“The mother-child relationship is established between a woman and a 
child by:  (1) the woman’s having given birth to the child [, except as otherwise provided in 
[Article] 8]; (2) an adjudication of the woman’s maternity; [or] (3) adoption of the child by 
the woman [; or (4) an adjudication confirming the woman as a parent of a child born to a 
gestational mother if the agreement was validated under [Article] 8 or is enforceable under 
other law].” (alterations in original)). 
 40. See Richard Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intentions:  Assisted Reproduction and 
the Functional Approach to Parenthood, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 601 (2002) (noting that the 
judicial approach to maternity has yet to embrace all of its complexities—starting with 
surrogacy). 
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than, one woman.41  The current draft of the 2017 UPA responds to this 
stagnation by setting forth a new standard emphasizing gender neutrality in 
the interest of accommodating a multiplicity of families.42  This new 
provision would avoid “constitutional infirmit[ies] by amending the 
provisions so that they address and apply equally to same-sex couples.”43 
The proposed language of the amended UPA emphasizes “parent” rather 
than “mother” and “father” and deemphasizes “maternity” and “paternity” 
in favor of “parentage.”44  This approach displaces the language of 
marriage and the presumption of heterosexuality to make room for 
additional versions of the parent-child relationship.  Definitions of 
parentage in the current draft are merged into a single section to 
“remove . . . unnecessary distinctions based on gender.”45  Considering 
birth as one of several indicia of parentage—rather than the sole indication 
of parentage—allows other assertions of both male and female parentage to 
receive equal weight. 
II.  PARENTAL PRIVILEGE 
Parental status secures not only a right of access to children but also the 
prerogative to exclude others.  This power to exclude secures legal parents’ 
liberty interest46 in making decisions about their children’s care, custody, 
and control.47  Third parties cannot overcome the wishes of the legal parent 
who enjoys the fundamental right to make decisions about the child.  Only 
legal parents have this power—and courts defer to that fundamental 
autonomy.48 
In Troxel v. Granville,49 the Court supported a vision of independent 
parenthood free from state intrusions upon the family unit.50  The Court 
struck down a Washington statute that allowed third parties to petition for 
visitation over the objection of the legal parent.51  Calling the statute 
“breathtakingly broad,”52 the Court precluded interested claimants 
(relatives, caregivers, friends) from leapfrogging over parental decision 
making.53 
Although Troxel affirms judicial deference to parental autonomy, the 
decision reflects a limited vision of family, reproduction, and parentage that 
 
 41. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS OF UNIF. 
STATE LAWS, Draft for Discussion Only 2017) (“The 2002 UPA is written in gendered terms, 
and its provisions presume that couples consist of one man and one woman.”). 
 42. Id. § 102. 
 43. Id. prefatory note. 
 44. Id. § 201. 
 45. Id. § 201 cmt. 
 46. See generally Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 47. See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 48. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
 49. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 50. Id. at 65. 
 51. Id. at 67. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 64. 
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negates the valid interests of nontraditional families.  It presumes a 
common understanding of the term “parent” that is clearly demarcated by 
birth, marriage, and adoption.  Families that do not fit this classic triangle 
illustrate the asymmetry of power enjoyed by legal parents and the power to 
proscribe others. 
Legal parents are protected in their fundamental right to control access to 
their children, while other parents are subject to the legal parents’ 
constitutional prerogatives.  This is the traditional approach of relational 
parenthood, which determines access to children based on the relationship 
with the genetic birth mother.  If a legal parent is married or in a civil 
union, that partner has parental rights not due to a biological relationship to 
the child54 but because of the legal relationship to the legal parent.  But if 
partners are unmarried, their rights are less secure—especially if they live 
apart from the child.  Only a legal parent has the capacity to make decisions 
concerning the child’s health, education, religion, welfare, and custody and 
visitation.  Everyone else is a stranger in the law’s eyes. 
Alison D. v. Virginia M.55 is the paradigmatic example of parental 
privilege and other mother exclusion.56  In New York, two women met, 
cohabited, and planned to have a child together.57  Using donor sperm, their 
baby was born in July of 1981.58  They shared a household and medical 
expenses and expressly agreed to split responsibility for the child’s care.59  
The couple ended their relationship when their son was two and a half years 
old, and the nonbiological mother moved out of the home.60  She continued 
to pay for household expenses and maintained frequent visitation with the 
child.61  The custodial mother restricted visitation in 1986 and cut off 
communication completely when the other mother moved to Ireland for 
work the following year.62 
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that the nonbiological mother was 
“not a ‘parent’” within the meaning of the applicable statute.63  The court, 
acknowledging her “understandable concern for and interest in the child and 
of her expectation and desire that her contact with the child would 
continue,” held that she was not a biological or adoptive parent with 
standing to seek visitation rights.64  The court rejected her claims of de 
facto parenthood and parentage by estoppel, asserting that only parents 
(genetic mothers and fathers) had such rights.65  Granting nonparents (other 
 
 54. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989). 
 55. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991), overruled by Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 
N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016). 
 56. Id. at 29. 
 57. Id. at 28. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 29. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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mothers) these rights “would necessarily impair the parents’ right to 
custody and control.”66 
The Alison D. decision rejects the functional and performative indicators 
of parenthood in its adherence to the formal definition of “mother.”  While 
the case was decided during an era hostile to LGBT rights,67 its insistence 
on biology not only erased other nonparents but also granted the birth 
mother extraordinary, singular autonomy.  In this way, the genetic mother 
may receive the unilateral care and support from the other mother without 
obligation to release her exclusionary parental power.  In the same way that 
a landlord may oust a nonconforming tenant from rented property, the legal 
parent can evict others at will.68 
III.  MARITAL SECURITY 
Like much of family law, the determination of rights, protections, and 
privileges revolves around marriage.69  Marriage performs a “gatekeeping 
function”70 that ensures the primacy of the spouse’s claim over children 
born into the marriage and definitively identifies a particular individual as 
the other parent.  Like all spouses of genetic mothers, other parents’ rights 
to the child are relational—not inherent—regardless of any biological 
relationship.  It must be more than biology alone—they must perform the 
act of parenting.  This only occurs when access is granted.  Their legal 
existence as a parent is predicated upon consent:  their own consent to 
marriage or the biological birth mother’s consent to that parental 
relationship. 
Marriage is especially important to nonbiological parents in same-sex 
relationships.  Now that the Supreme Court has recognized marriage as a 
cognizable constitutional right,71 the traditional concept of parenthood is 
ripe for profound reexamination.72  Because marriage has historically 
focused on heterosexual relations and reproduction, the rhetoric and 
expectations around the institution must change to reflect new articulations 
of legitimacy.  Yet there is still a dearth of statutory language expressing a 
marital presumption of parentage for the other parent in a same-sex couple. 
 
 66. Id.  The court’s demonstrative syntax, referring to the “impair[ing] [of] the parents’ 
right,” reveals a baseline assumption of two biological parents, male and female. Id. 
(emphasis added).  The court employs the article “the” rather than “a” and the plural 
possessive of “parents’” rather than the singular possessive “parent’s.” 
 67. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding a Georgia law 
banning sodomy only six years before Alison D. was decided). 
 68. Property theory invokes rights of possession, ownership, and exchange.  Such 
property analogies for the care and control of children effectively denote the legal parent’s 
dominion over the child.  Family law’s approach to parental rights as indivisible, flat, and 
finite, mirrors these doctrinal interests. See Kevin Noble Maillard, Rethinking Children as 
Property:  The Transitive Family, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 225, 229 (2010). 
 69. See Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law:  A Legal Structure for Nonmarital 
Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 168 (2015). 
 70. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
1185, 1204 (2016). 
 71. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 72. NeJaime, supra note 70, at 1187. 
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In McLaughlin v. Jones,73 two women married in California in 2008.74  
Both planned to conceive a child with donor sperm, but only one become 
pregnant.75  Before the birth, the couple signed a coparenting agreement 
that waived all laws giving the birth mother greater rights to custody and 
visitation.76  The child was born in 2011, and the marriage broke down in 
2013.77  Cutting off contact with the child, the genetic birth mother asserted 
herself as “the only parent and therefore the only person who has parental 
rights, which are fundamental rights.”78 
McLaughlin represents deliberately planned, mutually agreed upon 
parenting—the pregnancy in question was not accidental, unilateral, or 
coercive.  The women mutually agreed to have children together, made 
possible by technologies enabling reproductive opportunities beyond 
heterosexual coitus.  Yet, only the genetic birth mother can claim the 
categorical security of parental status and the concomitant right to exclude.  
The “co-mother,” or other mother, has no independent right of her own. 
What is the meaning of paternity in a marriage when there is no father?  
The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the marital presumption of 
parentage rightfully includes female spouses because paternity 
“encompasses the notion of parenthood . . . voluntarily established without 
regard to biology.”79  Even though the other mother did not carry the child, 
she may assert relational rights through marriage.80 
IV.  GESTATION 
The difficult question is whether maternity alone should shield genetic 
birth mothers from challenges to their authority over children.  Does the 
physical act of carrying the child to term bestow superior rights?  Surrogacy 
cases provide some insight into this question. 
Gestation alone does not automatically qualify the carrier as a mother.  
Under traditional surrogacy, which has recently become disfavored by 
intended parents,81 the gestational carrier uses her own ova, which gives her 
a genetic link to the child.  By contrast, gestational surrogacy is 
distinguished by the lack of a genetic link to the child. 
In the well-known New Jersey case In re Baby M,82 the intended parents, 
William and Elizabeth Stern, paid $10,000 to Mary Beth Whitehead to 
 
 73. 382 P.3d 118 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016). 
 74. Id. at 119. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 124.  The agreement also stated that the nonbiological mother would 
“participate in a second parent adoption of the child if and when the parties reside in a 
jurisdiction that permits second parent adoptions.” Id. 
 77. Id. at 119–20. 
 78. Id. at 121. 
 79. Id. at 123. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988) (describing this form of 
surrogacy in negative terms). 
 82. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
2017] OTHER MOTHERS 2637 
become pregnant through artificial insemination with William’s sperm.83  
They did not use donor ova, making Whitehead the biological mother of the 
child.84  The parties entered into a contract where Whitehead would give 
birth and then surrender her maternal rights to the adoptive parents.85  But 
after the birth, Whitehead changed her mind and insisted upon keeping the 
child.86 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision to 
enforce the contract.87  Recognizing the conflict between the parties as an 
“escalating dispute about rights, morality, and power,” the court viewed the 
surrogacy agreement as the “sale of a mother’s right to her child.”88  
Indeed, the court described the monetary payment to Whitehead as a form 
of “loathsome” baby bartering.89  Still, the court found that placing the 
child with the Sterns was in the child’s best interests; Baby M would be 
raised by the intended parents.90 
The California Supreme Court took a substantively different approach in 
Johnson v. Calvert.91  In 1990, Mark and Crispina Calvert signed a 
surrogacy contract with Anna Johnson.92  Johnson was implanted with an 
embryo created with Mark’s sperm and Crispina’s egg.93  The Calverts 
agreed to pay Johnson $10,000, plus a $200,000 life insurance policy.94  
The relationship between the parties broke down, and Johnson threatened to 
keep the child unless she received full payment of her fee.95  The Calverts 
responded with a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that they were the 
legal parents.96  The trial court held that the surrogacy contract was valid 
and the Calverts were the “genetic, biological, and natural” parents.97 
On appeal, the court determined that the UPA, adopted by California in 
1975, encompassed parental intention in surrogacy contracts and other 
alternative reproductions.98  When genetics and gestation do not coincide 
within the same woman, then the woman who “intended to bring about the 
birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own” is the natural 
mother.99  This purposeful reproduction denies the gestational carrier of any 
constitutional rights under California law. 
 
 83. Id. at 1235. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 1236. 
 87. Id. at 1235. 
 88. Id. at 1248. 
 89. Id. at 1241. 
 90. Id. 
 91. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
 92. Id. at 778. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 99. Calvert, 851 P.2d at 782. 
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Courts have taken a significantly different approach to maternity when 
both mothers have a biological role in gestation.  One mother may donate 
her ova to her female partner with the intent of conceiving a child.100  Like 
the distinction between traditional and gestational surrogacy, the donor’s 
rights are not securely protected without clear statutory articulations of her 
maternal rights.  Biology alone is insufficient to declare her an intended 
parent. 
In K.M. v. E.G.,101 a couple who had registered as domestic partners 
decided to conceive a child to raise together.102  K.M. donated ova to E.G. 
and signed a consent form in March 1995 acknowledging her donation and 
waiving her rights to the ova or any child resulting from pregnancy.103  
K.M.’s form stated, “I specifically disclaim and waive any right in or any 
child that may be conceived as a result of the use of any ovum or egg of 
mine, and I agree not to attempt to discover the identity of the recipient 
thereof.”104  Similarly, E.G. signed a separate consent form that read, “I 
acknowledge that the child or children produced by the IVF procedure is 
and shall be my own legitimate child or children and the heir or heirs of my 
body with all rights and privileges accompanying such status.”105  K.M. 
testified that she believed the language to be inapplicable because she was 
the intended, identifiable parent.106  E.G. gave birth to twins in December 
1995.107 
The couple raised the children together, but the relationship dissolved in 
2001.108  E.G. argued that she never intended for K.M. to be a mother and 
that she intended to raise the children as her own.109  Under California law, 
“true ‘egg donation’” with an anonymous donor and a gestational carrier 
with intent to parent deems the birth mother the natural mother.110 
But the California Supreme Court recognized K.M.’s relationship to the 
children under the UPA.  Regardless of the disagreement between the 
women as to how to define who was the parent, the women both intended 
for the child to be raised in their joint home.111  Clarifying the intent rule 
laid down in Calvert, the court made room for both birth and biology as 
definitive evidence of a mother-child relationship.112  Finding that intent 
 
 100. One commentator has called this mother the “ova mother.” Catherine Villareale, 
Note, The Case of Two Biological Intended Mothers:  Illustrating the Need to Statutorily 
Define Maternity in Maryland, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 365, 373 (2013). 
 101. 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005). 
 102. Id. at 676. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 675. 
 109. Id. at 683 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
 110. Id. at 684. 
 111. Id. at 680 (majority opinion). 
 112. Id. 
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and biology took precedence over boilerplate language, the court dismissed 
the effect of K.M.’s waiver and declared her a parent.113 
V.  DEFENSES AND CRITIQUES OF MATERNITY 
The question remains as to whether the “mother’s” status deserves 
exceptional treatment and deference.  This conversation is complicated by 
the multiple forms of maternal claims currently available.  The dissent in 
K.M. urges caution in declaring ova donors’ rights as equal to those of the 
partners’ because it interferes with the constitutional rights of the birth 
mother.114  Viewing maternal rights in this way, as a distinct and finite 
commodity, cannot account for multiple mothers in one family.  This view 
can exist only in the absence of—not coexistence with—other mothers. 
Other commentators have expressed similar views of maternal 
exceptionalism.  Scholar Martha Fineman argues that gender-neutral 
language in family law devalues women’s roles in mothering.115  The 
failure to view motherhood as a unique concept sacrifices the highly 
gendered contributions of women to childbirth and child rearing to the 
“legal[ly] generic category of ‘Parent.’”116  Explaining that the 
“Mother/Child dyad . . . [is] ‘[t]he most vivid and shared image of 
connection,’”117 Fineman rejects decentering motherhood in the interest of 
supporting “those who have constructed their lives around gendered 
roles.”118 
Fineman’s nuanced position regarding the exceptionalism of motherhood 
stands in contrast to the standard of maternal deference advocated for by 
other commentators.119  Scholar Rena K. Uviller argued that the adoption of 
gender equality in custody disputes fails to “take into account the mother’s 
disproportionate child rearing responsibilities in the early years.”120  Uviller 
also viewed fathers’ rights and parental neutrality as “indictment[s] against 
American feminism” that run counter to the majority of women’s 
interests.121  Similarly, Mary Becker contended that mothers have closer 
bonds to children because of “emotional consequences of the reproductive 
labor—pregnancy, labor, nursing—done only by women.”122  Under this 
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view, women have more intense attachments to children that advantage 
them in determining the best interests of children.123 
Adopting a “lesbian ethic,”124 in the words of the late Paula Ettelbrick, 
complicates this dialogue venerating childbirth and genetics as 
incomparable qualifiers of parenthood.  Additionally, this disrupts the use 
of gender as a predictable shorthand for the division of domestic labor and 
the determination of parentage.  Instead, Ettelbrick advocated a “functional 
indicia” of parenthood to replace blind adherence to biology and birth:  
emotional attachment, financial support, and physical custody of the 
child.125 
Newly inclusive concepts of family construction demand a 
transformation of the statutory frameworks that have long shaped a 
collective understanding of reproduction and kinship.  States must change 
to reflect a new articulation of maternity.  While marriage serves to clarify 
the ambiguities of determining parentage, nonmarital parenting and 
nonbiological “paternity” is much less secure and in need of explication.  
This legal lacuna allows birth mothers to capitalize upon and benefit from 
heteronormative constructions of parent-child relationships. 
The challenges other mothers face expose deep-seated assumptions about 
biology, gender, and parenting.  If nongestational mothers, such as adoptive 
or intended mothers, do not give birth, should they have weaker parental 
rights than birth mothers?126  In male-female dyads, considering mothers as 
inherently bonded to children cements the status of women as superior 
nurturers and caregivers.  This also presupposes pregnancy and biological 
function as defining maternal characteristics. 
This presupposition leaves other mothers with no rights in opposition to 
birth mothers’ exclusionary right to govern access to children.  If 
performance and labor were authoritative indicia of asserting parental 
rights, other mothers would qualify based on their intentionality.  The 
tenuous rights of other mothers, dependent on consent by the birth mother, 
demonstrate the inability of the current legal system to effectuate the 
traditionally nonnormative interests of newly normative families. 
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